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BAR BRIEFS
LAW BOOKS FOR SALE
Mrs. Kathleen 0. Cashel, widow of the late J. L. Cashel, a for-
mer member of this association, has for sale the law books here-
inafter described. Anyone interested write her at Grafton, N. D.
1943 North Dakota Code.
L. R. A. (NS) 52 Vols. and 20 Annual Vols. and Digest, 10 Vols.
and Desk Book.
Annotated Cases-Eng. and American, 21 Vols. and Digest.
North Dakota State Reports, Vols. 1-46.
1913 North Dakota Code.
AFTER A DECADE: THE REFLECTIONS OF A TRIAL AND
APPELLATE JUDGE
Excerpts from an address delivered by United States Circuit Judge
John D. Martin, of Tennessee, to the Judicial Conference for the
Sixth Circuit on October 18, 1945.-December issue of American Bar
Association Journal.
So many of you have served in the Federal judiciary so much
longer than I, and those of you who have not are men of such
keen discernment, that I hesitate to comment upon the obvious
obliteration of many long-established principles and the sweeping
revolutionary changes in Federal jurisprudence and procedure
which have been wrought within the range of the observation and
experience of a judge of merely ten-year tenure. The first revo-
lutionary impact within the past decade was the pronouncement
by the Supreme Court in 1937 that its predecessor justices had
erred for one hundred years in construing the Constitution as
conferring upon the courts of the United States power to declare
substantive rules of law. With that single blast, out went the
authoritative force of tomes of a century's carefully considered
expression of juristic concepts of the common law and the reasons
thereof. In came the judicial annotator to sit in the seat of the
Federal judge in diversity of citizenship cases.
It is far from my purpose to sketch even in skeleton outline the
death of the doctrine of stare decisis by referring to numerous
recent decisions of the highest Court overturning long-established
precedents, or to dwell upon the resultant confusion and conflict.
You are all too familiar with the details; and dissenting justices
have protested more robustly than in propriety would be per-
missible to a judge of a lower court. We all know that what the
Supreme Court may declare to be the law in almost any close case
was never more uncertain than now. The fact that one-sixth
of its reported decisions at the last term were rendered by five
to four votes offers no assurance of an early stage of greater cer-
tainty. Formerly, divisions in the Court resulted generally from
fundamental differences in interpretation of the Constitution.
But no such delimitation upon divergence of opinion seems to exist
today, for the divergent views of the justices appear to range all
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fields of statutory construction and the entire area of the subject-
matter committed to the final jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES VS. THE JUDICIAL POWER
No more startling innovation has come about within the past
decade than the widespread building-up of administrative tri-
bunals in derogation of the judicial power, which some of us have
thought was firmly vested by the Constitution in the courts alone.
So frequently have we been reminded of our inferiority in
expertness to various administrative boards and agencies exercis-
ing more than quasi-judicial powers but still subject to our review
upon petitions for enforcement of their orders, that some fortitude
on the part of a circuit judge is necessary for avoidance of an
inferiority complex. So steadily has our power of independent
decision been curtailed by Acts of Congress and interpretative
opinions of the Supreme Court, that we sometimes wonder wheth-
er we are considered inferior courts in an actual as well as in the
comparative sense of the word "inferior" as used in the Con-
stitution.
Too LIMITED SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Our practical function in the review of rulings of administrative
boards has been reduced to reading records for possible discovery
of that rare case wherein there is no evidence, however slight,
from which the Board could reasonably have drawn inferences
upon which a finding of fact was based. We have been repeatedly
and emphatically warned that we dare not substitute our own
inferences from fact for those of the Board; and in tax cases, the
mystery remains unsolved as to what constitutes a plain mistake
of law made by the "better staffed" Tax Court, formerly the
Board of Tax Appeals, whose decisions, upon petition, we must
continue to review.
To my thinking, it is not in the public interest that the seal of a
United States Circuit Court of Appeals should, by compulsion,
become a rubber stamp for the approval of the all-too-often arbi-
trary action of an administrative agency. Unless, through Acts
of Congress, the people restore to the United States Circuit Courts
of Appeal a modicum of their former significance in the scheme of
national government, their present partial eclipse may soon be-
come total. A fair appraisal of the record of these intermediate
appellate tribunals would impel the conclusion that they desire a
higher degree of faith in their intelligence, efficiency and expert-
ness in the administration of justice than has been evinced in the
gradual divestiture of their right to reason and to render judg-
ment with appropriate independence.
,PRIDE IN THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
Though a natural born optimist, I agree with the cynic who said
that nothing is permanent except change. Whether the existing
eclipse of the courts of appeal is temporary or permanent, I am
pleased and proud to sit upon a bench once adorned by Taft and
Lurton, Jackson and Day, Warrington, Denison and Knappen
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We of the present succession strive earnestly, within our natural
limitations, to uphold the traditions which have been handed down
to us by those great jurists and by our other predecessors who
once sat so worthily in the places which we now occupy.
A COMPARISON OF DUTIES AND APPROACH
Friends who know how much I enjoyed my work as district
judge frequently ask whether I like my present position as well.
The question cannot be answered satisfactorily; for I have been
happy on both jobs, and the work of the one is so different from
that of the other as to make comparison difficult. The life of a
United States circuit judge is that of a scholar; the law library
is his workshop. He becomes increasingly addicted to deliberation
and reflection, and, moreover, to philosophy. He must read more,
study harder, and try to write better, than he did as district judge.
He must take care that his long, solitary hours, day and night,
devoted to records, briefs and legal authorities and opinion-writing
do not diminish his interest in human affairs and in his fellow
men. His life is more personally independent, and he is under
less constraint; but he must beware that his fewer human con-
tacts do not cause him to lose the common touch. Despite the
restrictions upon his official independence which have been briefly
noted, a United States circuit judge, once in a blue moon, enjoys
a wider opportunity than he had as district judge, to contribute
something of real value to American jurisprudence.
What he misses most is action. To-me, the forum of the United
States district court has always seemed the most interesting
place in the world. How eagerly the judge ascends his bench
each morning, never knowing just how difficult may be the deci-
sions of the day or what he may be called upon to decide. He must
be ever alert, keen in discernment, quick but unhurried in action,
and unerring and immediate in detection of the panther tread.
A purringly presented ex parte order, carelessly scanned by the
judge who enters it, often contains concealed claws.
No judge can afford to forget that orders when entered are the
orders of the judge and not of the attorneys who prepare them,
even though entered by consent. No order, judgment, decree, or
other official document should ever be signed by a judge before
he has first carefully read it and has assured himself that he
fully understands its meaning and effect. In my ten-year tenure,
I have found no occasion for a single deviation from this self-
imposed, inflexible rule.
DELAY IN THE DECISION CASES
Delay in prompt procedure and decision has been productive
of severe criticism of the courts, and has, doubtless, been a
weighty contributing cause to the curtailment of court jurisdic-
tion and the building up of administrative boards as tribunals.
Down my way, a gentleman and scholar of marked ability served
as United States district judge more than forty years ago. His
erudite opinions, written with the literary skill of a classicist, are
good reading today. Doubtless they should be, for he often took
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five years to write one. When I came to the bar in 1905, old
lawyers told me that the judge had been known to delay the
disposition of a demurrer for ten years; and that three years for
the decision of any matter taken under advisement was his mean
proportional. He once held a land case involving the law of accre-
tions under advisement so long that, by the time he rendered
judgment, the change in the current of the Mississippi River had
washed the land away. True, this is an instance of extreme delay,
fortunately rare; but, unfortunately, we judges of the present era
have had to do extra time in our speed-cause effort to overcome
the fixed belief of laymen and legislators that there is inherent
infirmity in the procedure and processes of the courts toward
seasonable disposition of litigation.
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The most important development in Federal court procedure
during the past decade was the promulgation of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the district courts. When I went on the bench in
1935, diligent effort to locate a collation of local court rules was
fruitless. Various and sundry unindexed orders, some recorded,
some unrecorded, in minute books, had been entered here and
there, at this time or that, without respect to either orderly ar-
rangement or logical relationship. These diversified orders were
said to constitute the court rules. This confusing situation pre-
sented an intolerable trap to the unwary and a manifestly unfair
advantage to the practitioner who happened to have personal or
hearsay knowledge of the existence of some obscure court order
adopting a certain rule. There seemed to be only one logical thing
to do, so I did it; I abolished all local rules and appointed a com-
mittee of lawyers experienced in Federal practice to prepare and
submit, first to the bar associations of the district and finally to
the court, suggested local rules of procedure.
The Rules of Civil Procedure have contributed heavily to the
cause of simplicity, brevity and clarity in pleading, liberality in
the admissibility of evidence, human and documentary, and easier
access to the discovery of evidence in the interest of truth. Serv-
ice of process has been simplified and the necessity of noting for-
mal exceptions to rulings abrogated. Reference to masters has
been declared to be the exception and not the rule.
I think the most vitally beneficial rule is that the trial judge
must file findings of fact and conclusions of law in all cases tried
without a jury. This rule operates best when opposing counsel
are directed to prepare in advance of the trial their proposed
findings and conclusions and to submit them to the judge for
examination and consideration as the trial progresses. The ad-
vantage gained is that the judge, when hearing the evidence, has
before him in concrete form the opposing theories of fact and of
law which will enable him, while the evidence in its relationship
to the legal propositions presented is fresh in his mind, to adopt,
reject or modify each finding of fact or conclusion of law submit-
ted. He may wisely elect to hear argument for and against the
adoption of any proposed finding or conclusion.
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DIVERGENCES OF OPINION AS TO RULE 49 (b)
It is inevitable that there should be divergence of opinion upon
the efficacy of some of the rules. Personally, I do not like Rule
49 (b), pertaining to the submission to the jury of interrogatories
upon issues of fact. The jurors' answers to specific questions
propounded are often inconsistent, inter sese, as well as with the
general verdict, in consequence of the compromising of individual
opinions in the course of discussion and deliberation in the jury
room. I believe in the inviolability of the jury system; and in my
judgment whenever twelve jurors join in a general verdict, that
verdict, if supported by substantial evidence, should be upheld
unless reversible error in law has been committed upon the trial or
during the procedings. I have never believed that the trial judge
should be rated as a thirteenth juror, though that doctrine has
long prevailed in Tennessee.
RULE 50(b) AND JUDGMENTS NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO
Naturally, one who does not approve Rule 49(b) would disap-
prove Rule 50(b), whereby within ten days after the verdict the
losing party may renew and the court may grant a motion for
directed verdict made and denied at the trial. The vesting of such
discretionary power in the district judge, however, is no indication
that the rule-makers intended its too free and frequent exercise.
A true believer in the sanctity of trial by jury would not incline
toward entering judgments non obstante veredicto, except in the
rarest cases. The argument that causes are brought to finality
with greater dispatch when the trial judge makes free use of his
power is, to my mind, offset by the danger that the judge may
too readily assume himself to be the final trier of facts in jury
cases and form the habit of substituting his own inferences for
those drawn by the jury. Let the trial judge, according to the
best of his ability and understanding and with time out, if neces-
sary, for hearing elaborate argument and for due deliberation,
concentrate on appropriate judgment upon the motion for a di-
rected verdict before he submits the case to the jury.
Nor does the argument seem valid that the judge should be
accorded additional time for consideration of the motion, after
the jury has resolved the fact issues. Procrastination is not a
dependable guidepost to correct decision. Moreover, clear under-
standing by the jurors of all that has transpired during their
term of service tends to establish good will and respect for the
United States District Court in which they have been called to
serve. When a judge directs a verdict, he wisely explains then
and there his reasons for doing so. Jurors do not easily compre-
hend why, after the fact issues have been submitted to them,
the judge should set their verdict aside and enter a diametrically
opposite verdict of his own.
RULE 61 Is HEARTILY APPROVED
In closing comment upon the Rules of Civil Procedure, I would
join in a mighty cheer for Rule 61. Certainly a trial court Should
at every stage in the proceedings disregard any error or defect
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which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. How
wise were the rule-makers in vesting the district judge with broad
discretion in his conduct of the trial! There can be no streamlined
substitute for sound common sense.
Not only should a district judge be expert in statutory construc-
tion and profoundly versed in tents of the common law and princi-
ples of equity jurisprudence, but he should be endowed with
fervor for substantial justice and possessed of a warm heart con-
trolled by a cool brain.
SAFE AND SOLID GROUND MUST BE FOUND AND KEPT
In the most progressive era in world history, my faith is in fear-
less progress. I believe neither in adhering to hoary but unsound
precedents because they are hoary nor in damming up fresh cur-
rents of new ideas because they are new. But safe and solid
ground always lies between swiftly moving currents of new
ideology.
The re-establishment of justice and tranquitly among the peo-
ples of a bewildered world confronts and challenges us all. The
grim determination, courage and unstinted self-sacrifice of the
fighting young manhood of America, aided by brave nurses and
service women, have assured us that law and order, religion and
civilization will prevail in the United States. Our returning sol-
diers, sailors, airmen and marines will see to it that our institu-
tions and our way of life shall be preserved. The President, the
Congress and the courts must uphold the principles for which they
fought. To that end, may the balance of power among the three
great departments, which constitutes the distinctive genius of
our form of government, be maintained as an eternal safeguard
against tyranny. May the Federal courts, bounden within their
appropriate sphere, ever adjudicate wisely and justly. After a
decade on the bench, I have firm faith that they will.
